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SEXY DRESSING REVISITED: DOES TARGET DRESS PLAY A PART IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES? 
THERESA M. BEINER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last year, a great deal of public discussion focused on why women 
are apparently dressing and behaving more provocatively.1 However, issues 
surrounding women’s dress are nothing new. Feminists have been debating 
what constitutes appropriate female attire since the beginning of the feminist 
movement in the United States.2 Since the early 1990s, when Naomi Wolf’s book 
The Beauty Myth3 was released, feminists, law professors, and popular culture 
critics have tried to understand women’s dress in the present day. No one 
theory explains the current happenings with women’s dress—instead, the 
discussion leads to tension within feminist theory: Are women exercising 
freedom to dress as they please or are they simply buying into their own 
objectification? Interestingly enough, tension also arises in the social science 
research: How can one account for studies suggesting that people believe 
women’s dress is a factor in offenses (such as sexual assault), while other studies 
suggest that dress is not a factor in determining who is victimized? In 
succeeding parts of this article, I will examine women’s dress in a particular 
context—that of sexual harassment. I will examine the case law to see if and how 
the dress of sexual harassment targets4 plays a part in sexual harassment cases. I 
also will look at the social sciences and the feminist theories that frame sexual 
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 1. See, e.g., PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED (2005); ARIEL LEVY, FEMALE CHAUVINIST PIGS: WOMEN 
AND THE RISE OF RAUNCH CULTURE (2005); SHMULEY BOTEACH, HATING WOMEN: AMERICA’S HOSTILE 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FAIRER SEX (2005); LINDA M. SCOTT, FRESH LIPSTICK (2005). 
 2. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 3. NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN 
(paperback ed. 2002). 
 4. Throughout this essay I refer to persons who are subjected to workplace sexual harassment 
interchangeably as “targets,” “victims,” and “plaintiffs.” I use the term “target” instead of “victim” 
in many instances to avoid the connotations that come along with the idea of victimization. This 
does not mean that women who experience workplace harassment are not victims in the normal 
sense in which the word is used. However, the idea of “victimhood” has negative references that 
connote a lack of agency, which I intend to undermine with the use of the term “target.” In addition, 
I also refer to “target dress” as a shorthand way to refer to what a sexual harassment target is 
wearing. 
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harassment as another form of sex discrimination. All of this is part of a greater 
effort to understand how women’s dress might or might not impact the 
treatment of sexual harassment cases. 
In doing so, I will draw on scholarship—both legal and social scientific—
from a related area of criminal law: rape. Scholars have long recognized how a 
target’s dress can influence outcomes in rape cases.5 Jurors often blame the 
victims, believing that their provocative dress somehow plays a part in the 
perpetrator’s decision to rape. In spite of years of criticism of these beliefs, the 
bias this injects into rape trials, and even with the enactment of rape shield 
laws,6 this evidence still sneaks into rape cases.7 With this in mind, one would 
expect a similar phenomenon to occur in sexual harassment cases. For instance, 
judges and jurors might believe that the target somehow invited the harassment 
by dressing provocatively. In sexual harassment cases, the argument that target 
dress is relevant is more compelling, although equally misguided, than in rape 
cases. Sexual harassment law requires a plaintiff to show that the harassment 
was “unwelcome.”8 As the Supreme Court stated in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, no per se rule exists barring the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s 
provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies.9 Meritor opened the 
door to the admission of such evidence in the sexual harassment context. 
However, the door was closed on this evidence—or, at least, nudged partly 
shut—by the extension of the federal rape shield law to civil cases. Against the 
recommendations of Chief Justice Rehnquist,10 Fed. R. Evid. 412 became 
applicable to civil cases in 1994. Given the rule’s lack of a bright-line standard 
for admissibility and the Court’s earlier position that in some cases such 
evidence would be admissible, one would expect to find considerable case law 
canvassing the admissibility of such evidence in sexual harassment cases. 
Interestingly, few—if any—cases since Rule 412’s extension to civil cases 
address this issue. One is left wondering why civil defendants are not using this 
line of argument, which criminal defendants have successfully exploited.11 
 
 5. See, e.g., Chen Shen, Study: From Attribution and Thought-Process Theory to Rape-Shield Laws: 
The Meanings of Victim’s Appearance in Rape Trials, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 435, 447 (2003); Alinor C. 
Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic Meanings of Women’s 
Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87, 104–06 (1995); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING 
ETC. (1993); Gary D. Lafree, Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ 
Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389, 401 (1985) (study of jurors in rape 
trials noting that victim history often finds its way into rape trials in spite of rape shield laws). 
 6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. Rape Shield Laws are defined as “A statute that restricts or 
prohibits the use, in rape or sexual-assault cases, of evidence about the past sexual conduct of the 
victim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (8th ed. 2004). 
 7. For the ways in which this happens, see Shen, supra note 5, at 447. 
 8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 9. Id. at 69. 
 10. Letter of April 29, 1994 from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to John F. Gerry, contained in 
Communication from the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court of the United States (May 2, 1994), House 
doc. 103-250, 103d Congress, 2d Sess. 
 11. Most notably, evidence about the victim’s dress was used effectively by defense attorneys in 
the William Kennedy Smith case. For a description of the dress evidence that was admitted in that 
case and an analysis of its use, see Sterling, supra note 5, at 113–15. 
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This article reflects the process by which I approached the subject of 
provocative dress and sexual harassment law. It begins by considering why a 
sexual harassment target’s dress might be a subject of dispute in a sexual 
harassment case. This includes a discussion of its relevance to sexual harassment 
cases as well as the ambiguities in the rape shield law that should lead to 
litigation on the issue. It then considers those sexual harassment cases in which 
the plaintiff’s dress was discussed by the court in the course of its decision. I 
discovered very few cases in which the sexual harassment target’s dress was 
relevant; where it was, it rarely came into play in the case in the manner I 
expected—in particular, as a means for the defendant to argue that the target 
welcomed the sexually harassing behavior. Thus, I was left wondering why 
there were few cases about an issue when I expected to find many. From there, I 
looked for possible explanations for this “null set.” In particular, I looked to 
social science and feminist legal theory to explain why the provocative dress of a 
sexual harassment target does not seem to play a major role in defending against 
these cases. In doing so, I draw on research about how rapist choose their targets 
as well as research on perceptions of what victim behavior leads to sexual 
harassment. Based on this, I posit an explanation for the dearth of cases that 
suggests that sexual harassment does not operate as people often assume. 
II. THE LAW ON TARGET DRESS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES 
A. History: Supreme Court Precedent and Federal Rule of Evidence 412 
The history of the use of dress in sexual harassment cases suggests that the 
admissibility of target dress would be a hotly-contested issue in such cases. 
Early sexual harassment case law provides the occasional example of a sexual 
harassment plaintiff’s case harmed by evidence of her workplace attire.12 This 
precedent suggested that how the plaintiff dressed might play a role in 
determining whether she was sexually harassed. Eventually, the rules of 
evidence were changed in a manner that made the admissibility of target dress 
less likely. Imposing a balancing test, the new evidentiary rule encouraged case 
by case determinations of admissibility. It was not adopted without controversy. 
As I explain below, the Supreme Court itself questioned the new evidence rule’s 
constitutionality. This section provides a brief history of the use of target dress 
in sexual harassment cases, with an eye toward explaining why one would 
expect to see cases that debate the admissibility of sexual harassment target 
dress. 
The admissibility of evidence of a target’s dress became an important issue 
in the first sexual harassment case that the Supreme Court assessed, Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson.13 In Meritor, the Court first set out the elements a plaintiff 
must prove in order to have a viable hostile environment sexual harassment 
claim. The lower court had found that any relationship between Mechelle 
 
 12. See Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment 
Plaintiff’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L. REV. 117, 
126–35 (1993) (describing several early cases involving dress). 
 13. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
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Vinson and her harasser was voluntary. Therefore, it did not amount to sexual 
harassment. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the “gravamen” of a 
sexual harassment claim is that the harasser’s conduct be “unwelcome.”14 Thus, 
evidence that suggested whether the plaintiff welcomed the behavior of the 
purported harasser became relevant to this element essential to the claim. In 
addition, the Court also set the standard for what level the harassment had to 
reach in order to be actionable. As the Court explained, “not all workplace 
conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or 
privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.”15 Instead, “[f]or 
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to 
alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”16 
The Court specifically addressed how the plaintiff’s dress might play a role 
in its newly-created unwelcomeness analysis. The lower courts disagreed about 
whether evidence of the plaintiff’s dress should be admissible in her sexual 
harassment case.17 The D.C. Circuit explained that the evidence of plaintiff’s 
dress and personal fantasies “had no place in this litigation.”18 The United States 
Supreme Court disagreed, explaining: 
While “voluntariness” in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it 
does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is 
irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular 
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously 
relevant. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine 
the existence of sexual harassment in light of “the record as a whole” and the 
“the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the 
context in which the alleged incidents occurred.”19 
Although the Court did not state that evidence of the sexual harassment target’s 
provocative dress was always admissible, this decision provided a basis for 
employers to discover and request admission of such evidence in sexual 
harassment cases, especially on the issue of unwelcomeness. 
Eight years after Meritor, the admissibility of such evidence became less 
likely when Rule 412 was extended to civil cases. Rule 412 provides that in cases 
involving “sexual misconduct,” evidence offered to prove that a target engaged 
in other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition generally would not be 
admissible.20 However, there is an exception for civil cases: 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 67. 
 16. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). 
 17. See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), rev’d, 753 F.2d 141, 
146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d sub nom., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The district 
court did not directly address the plaintiff’s dress. However, the court of appeals surmised that the 
district court “may” have considered her dress in finding that the conduct was “voluntary.” 753 F.2d 
at 146 n.36. 
 18. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36. 
 19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
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In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible 
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of 
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged 
victim’s reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the 
alleged victim.21 
Thus, the person wishing to have the evidence admitted—generally the 
defendant in a sexual harassment case—must satisfy this balancing test and 
convince a court that the probative value of the evidence “substantially 
outweighs” the potential harm to the target as well as any resulting prejudice. 
Such balancing tests generally lend themselves to case-specific factors. Therefore 
it is reasonable to expect litigation on this issue, in spite of the extension of Rule 
412 to civil cases.22 
Although it might not be clear from the text of the rule itself, the advisory 
committee’s notes explain that the rule is applicable to sexual harassment cases. 
As the notes explain, “Rule 412 will . . . apply in a Title VII action in which the 
plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment.”23 The advisory committee also 
explained that the purpose of the rule is to protect plaintiffs against “invasion of 
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated 
with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual 
innuendo into the factfinding process.”24 The rule is designed to encourage 
plaintiffs to come forward and pursue actions against sexual offenders.25 Having 
one’s private life on display in court would create a significant disincentive for 
targets of harassment to report such behavior and pursue these claims. 
The advisory committee’s notes go further, however, and appear to counter 
the Meritor Court’s position on dress. The notes define the behavior intended to 
be precluded by the rule to “include activities of the mind, such as fantasies or 
dreams.”26 In seeking to protect the target from stereotypical thinking that might 
result from such evidence, the notes specifically state that “unless the (b)(2) 
exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim’s dress, 
speech, or lifestyle will not be admissible.”27 Thus, the rule’s drafters 
contemplated how the rule would impact sexual harassment cases: Evidence of 
the target’s dress is normally inadmissible. In limiting the admissibility of this 
evidence, it appears that the advisory committee attempted to counteract or, at 
least, undermine the Court’s decision on this point in Meritor. 
 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
 22. The rule also sets forth a specific procedure a defendant must follow before he or she may 
offer such evidence, which requires filing a written motion at least fourteen days before trial. FED. R. 
EVID. 412(c)(1). A party seeking to admit such evidence must include a description of the evidence 
and the purpose of its use in the motion. Id. It also provides that the court conduct a hearing in 
camera which allows the parties to be heard before the evidence is admitted. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2). 
Thus, the rule creates some protection for targets of sexual abuse. 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 412, advisory committee’s note. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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The drafters also took the opportunity to comment on how the rule might 
affect the discovery process. Sometimes simply having to reveal private 
information to the opposing party can discourage women from pursuing 
otherwise meritorious claims. Even if the information is not admissible, damage 
may still result from the embarrassment of having to release such information to 
the defendant or the court. Thus, limiting discovery of this personal information 
seems sensible. The drafters of the rule agreed. The advisory committee’s notes 
contemplate that a court will enter appropriate protective orders to limit 
discovery of information protected under Rule 412. Although the note 
acknowledges that Rule 412 does not directly apply to discovery, it explains: 
“[i]n order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412 . . . courts should enter 
appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (governing protective 
orders) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure 
confidentiality.”28 It explains that such orders should be “presumptively” 
entered, and any party wishing to discover such information would have to 
show that the “evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the 
facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through 
discovery.”29 
However, given the Supreme Court’s position on the relevance of target 
dress evidence, these advisory notes might not afford much protection to 
targets. The drafters went on to explain that, “[i]n an action for sexual 
harassment . . . some evidence of the alleged victim’s sexual behavior and/or 
predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant.”30 Thus, the question 
remains whether evidence of workplace dress is covered by the discovery 
prohibition. Still, the notes’ contemplation that dress would normally be 
inadmissible under Rule 412, absent the defendant satisfying the balancing test, 
should give sexual harassment targets some solace. 
The discussion of Rule 412’s application to sexual harassment cases is 
limited to the advisory committee’s notes. Although the Supreme Court has 
used the advisory committee’s notes in its decisions regarding the Federal Rules 
of Evidence,31 it has not done so specifically with respect to Rule 412. Also, the 
Supreme Court and various courts of appeal suggest that, while the federal rules 
advisory committee’s notes are viewed as “instructive”32 and “of weight,”33 both 
have been clear that the notes are neither binding nor determinative of a given 
issue in their interpretation of the rules.34 Lower courts have looked to the 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (emphasis added). 
 31. See., e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (using advisory committee notes to 
FED. R. EVID. 801); United States v. Vonn, 525 U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002) (“In the absence of a clear 
legislative mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes provide a reliable source of insight into the 
meaning of a rule, especially when, as here, the rule [FRCP 11] was enacted precisely as the 
Advisory Committee proposed.”) (alteration added). 
 32. Moody Nat’l Bank v. GE Life & Annuity Assurance Co., 383 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 33. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988). 
 34. See Torres, 487 U.S. at 316; Hokenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (explaining that, in interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 4, “[a]lthough not binding, the 
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advisory committee’s notes for guidance in assessing the discovery35 and 
admissibility of evidence under Rule 412.36 
It is unclear how much weight the Supreme Court would give the advisory 
committee notes interpretation, given its decision in Meritor that dress is 
sometimes relevant and its general opposition to extending Rule 412 to civil 
cases. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in voicing the Court’s opposition: 
Some members of the Court expressed the view that the amendment might 
exceed the scope of the Court’s authority under the Rules Enabling Act, which 
forbids the enactment of rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.” This Court recognized in Meritor Saving [sic] Bank v. Vinson that evidence 
of an alleged victim’s “sexually provocative speech or dress” may be relevant in 
workplace harassment cases, and some Justices expressed concern that the 
proposed amendment might encroach on the rights of defendants.37 
Some might see this as an invitation to open litigation on the issue of whether 
the Court exceeded its power under the Rules Enabling Act,38 as well as Rule 
412’s potential to infringe on the rights of defendants. This checkered history, 
combined with the fact that the main text of the rule does not speak to its 
applicability in sexual harassment cases, creates some uncertainty as to the 
extent Rule 412 will apply to target dress in sexual harassment cases. This 
uncertainty should have resulted in a great deal of civil litigation about the valid 
use of Rule 412 in cases in which target dress is potentially an issue. Yet, as I 
explain below, very few cases discuss this issue. Instead, target dress is being 
used in a variety of ways and often is introduced by the plaintiff in sexual 
harassment cases. 
B. Lower Court Dress Cases 
There are few lower court decisions involving Rule 412 that discuss 
whether evidence of a target’s dress is admissible in a sexual harassment case.39 
 
interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes ‘are nearly universally accorded great weight in 
interpreting federal rules.’” (quoting Vergis v. Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, 199 F.R.D. 216 (S.D. 
Ohio 2000))). 
 35. See, e.g., A.W. v. I. B. Corp., 224 F.R.D. 20, 23 (D. Me. 2004); Barta v. City & County of 
Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996). 
 36. See, e.g., Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179, 181 
(D. Md. 1997). 
 37. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to John F. Gerry, House Document 103-250, 
at v, 103d Congress, 2d Sess. (April 29, 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)) (internal citations omitted). 
 38. Through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress provided the Supreme Court with the authority 
to create rules governing the lower courts, including the Federal Rules of Evidence. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(a) (1990). The Act provides that the court “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.” § 2072(b) (1990). Thus, a rule that invades substantive rights can run afoul of the 
Act and be invalidated. 
 39. See Charles C. Warner, Motions in Limine in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 823, 854 (1999) (noting that “[s]ince the amendment to Rule 412 in December, 1994, there 
have been relatively few reported decision in civil cases substantively illuminating the application of 
the rule substantively.”). 
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It appears that when the rule is invoked, courts are generally applying it 
properly. There are some cases in which target dress evidence is admitted, but 
often it does not carry great weight on the unwelcomeness issue for the 
defendant. In most cases, Rule 412 is never discussed; hence it is difficult to 
know whether the rule was ever specifically raised in the case. 
Although early case law suggested that a defendant’s use of target dress in 
defending a case might prove a significant issue,40 case law since the adoption of 
Rule 412 suggests otherwise.41 Given the debate over the relevance of target 
dress to the unwelcomeness prong of a sexual harassment claim, as well as the 
balancing approach adopted in Rule 412(b), one would expect that defendants 
would at least attempt to use such evidence to prove that the harassment was 
not unwelcome. While there are many cases in which defendants use target 
behavior, including speech, in an attempt to prove the plaintiff welcomed the 
purportedly harassing behavior,42 few reported cases involve defendant’s using 
target dress to show the plaintiff welcomed the harassment. 
This section looks at the various ways in which target dress is playing a 
role in sexual harassment cases. First, it discusses the few cases in which the 
defendant attempts to use the target’s dress to show that she welcomed the 
harassment and Rule 412 is invoked. Second, it discusses cases in which target 
dress becomes an issue because the harassing incidents involve reactions to a 
target’s dress.43 In these cases, the plaintiff uses harasser comments about her 
dress to prove another element of the sexual harassment claim: that the 
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII. 
This set of cases includes several in which a harasser attempts to look down a 
target’s shirt or up a target’s skirt. Third, it describes cases in which a plaintiff 
was told to wear something different to work because her clothing was deemed 
inappropriate. The survey concludes with cases in which an employer suggested 
or required a plaintiff to wear revealing clothing. In most of these cases, the 
target’s dress is not being used by the defendant to show that the plaintiff 
welcomed the harassment. 
1. Admissibility Decisions Under Rule 412 
There are few decisions involving Federal Rule of Evidence 412 that discuss 
whether evidence of a target’s dress is admissible in a sexual harassment case.44 
However, in the few that have been decided, the courts tend not to admit the 
 
 40. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Plaintiff’s Conduct as Evidence in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1 (Nov. 4, 1994); Bull, supra note 12, at 119. 
 41. See, e.g., Jaros v. Lodgenet Entm’t Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) (refusing to admit 
evidence of victim’s dress under FED R. EVID. 412), abrogated by Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 
129 (2004). 
 42. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO 
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 68–74 (2005) (cataloguing cases). 
 43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 44. See Charles C. Warner, Motion in Limine in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 823, 854 (1999) (noting that “[s]ince the amendment to Rule 412 in December, 1994, there 
have been relatively few reported decision in civil cases illuminating the application of the rule 
substantively.”). 
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evidence, in keeping with the purposes behind the rule. Thus, it appears that 
when the Rule is invoked, the courts are (for the most part) applying it properly. 
There are some cases in which the evidence is admitted, but often it does not 
carry the day on the unwelcomeness issue for the defendant. In some, Rule 412 
is never discussed. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the Rule was ever raised 
in the case. 
Beginning with cases that were argued under Rule 412, the few courts that 
have considered the issue tend to use the rule to keep evidence of target dress 
out of the case. For example, in Arno v. Club Med, Inc., the defendant argued on 
appeal that the court erroneously refused to admit evidence of the target’s dress 
in a case involving a sexual assault.45 The defendant argued that her dress was 
relevant to whether she cooperated with the harasser in removing her clothing.46 
The court reasoned that: 
This argument is meritless. Under Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition is inadmissible. The 
scope of Rule 412 is broad. Indeed, its drafters intended it to exclude evidence 
that may have a sexual connotation, including “evidence such as that relating to 
the alleged victim’s mode of dress.” At trial, the Court found that the probative 
value of Arno’s clothing was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
Arno. Nevertheless, Defendants were permitted to cross-examine Arno about 
the clothing and how it was removed. Thus, the Court’s ruling did not prejudice 
Defendant’s ability to present their cooperation theory to the jury.47 
Likewise, in Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., the trial court excluded 
evidence under Rule 412, a decision with which the appellate court agreed.48 The 
defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the plaintiff “‘dressed in a 
manner that accentuated her figure more than was appropriate for the 
workplace.’”49 Acknowledging both the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor and 
Rule 412’s extension to civil cases, the district court reasoned: 
In this case, the probative value of Jaros’s attire was not strong. The only 
evidence excluded from trial were comments that Jaros sometimes wore tight-
fitting clothing. The proffered evidence was very weak. Most of Racz’s 
comments, moreover, had nothing to do with what Jaros was wearing, and 
many had less to do with Jaros’s figure than Racz’s own claimed sexual prowess 
or his speculation about Jaros’s sex life. The evidence proposed by LodgeNet, if 
admitted at trial, would have carried the attendant danger that jurors would 
base their verdicts on their opinions about Jaros’s morality and not the law of 
sexual harassment. While the aspects of Jaros’s dress proffered by LodgeNet 
 
 45. 1995 WL 380124 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1995). 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. (citing FED.R. EVID. 412, advisory committee note, 1994 amend.) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 48. 171 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (D.S.D. 2001), aff’d, 294 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Pa. 
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 49. Jaros, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (citation omitted). 
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prior to trial were marginally relevant, their probative value was not substantial 
enough to warrant their admission under Rule 412.50 
Thus, the court did not admit evidence of the plaintiff’s dress, which is 
consistent with Rule 412. 
There is the occasional case after Rule 412’s extension to civil cases in which 
this evidence is admitted. In Sublette v. Glidden Co., the court considered whether 
evidence of plaintiff’s dress was relevant, but the plaintiff’s actions were much 
more extreme than in those cases in which it was not admitted.51 Notably, the 
plaintiff in Sublette:52 (1) wore a sign “essentially saying ‘Best Blow Jobs on the #8 
line;’” (2) ripped her t-shirt and exposed her breast in front of others; and (3) 
permitted a male co-worker to “imprint his hand print in paint on the back 
bottom of her t-shirt, and on her buttocks.”53 The defendant argued that such 
actions were relevant to both welcomeness and whether she perceived the 
behavior to be offensive. In its Rule 412 analysis, the court began by noting that 
most cases cited by the parties permitted “evidence of conduct in the workplace 
to be introduced” under Rule 412.54 Under these circumstances, the court 
allowed the evidence to be admitted (at least preliminarily at the motion in 
limine stage), with the caveat that it might change its decision if it became clear 
that the purported harassers knew nothing of the plaintiff’s behavior or the 
plaintiff made it known directly that the harassment was unwelcome.55 
Even in cases in which the evidence of the target’s dress was admitted, its 
impact was minimal in persuading trial judges that the plaintiff welcomed the 
harassment. The cases prior to the effective date of the amendment to Rule 412 
show that courts did not find this evidence very compelling. For example, in 
Honea v. SGS Control Services, Inc., the defendant moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the plaintiff’s practice of occasionally not wearing a bra to work 
was evidence that the harassment was not unwelcome.56 The court disagreed: 
Aside from the fact that the text of Title VII does not require a woman to wear a 
bra in order to pursue a claim for sexual harassment, Honea’s deposition 
testimony counters the defendant’s implication by explaining that the reason 
she wore no bra was because she wore coveralls to work. Moreover, she also 
testified that she delivered roses to male and female workers alike.57 
Under these circumstances, the court denied the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion. 
Similarly, in Wilson v. Wayne County, the court was not impressed with the 
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s wearing short shorts to work and 
 
 50. Id. at 1003–04. 
 51. No. 97-CV-5047, 1998 WL 964189, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1998). 
 52. While the plaintiff engaged in other provocative behavior, the allegations described above 
are those that involved her clothing. See id. at *1–2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *3. 
 55. Id. at *4. 
 56. 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1994). 
 57. Id. 
03__BEINER.DOC 2/8/2007 2:01 PM 
 SEXY DRESSING REVISITED 135 
 
coming by the office in a bathing suit and shorts on her way back from a 
canoeing trip in some way welcomed her boss’ sexual assault.58 As the court 
explained, 
[t]he fact that an eighteen-year-old girl wore shorts during the summer months 
in Tennessee, wore a bathing suit on a canoe trip, and engaged in non-sexual 
horseplay with a co-worker her own age should not be perceived by even the 
most optimistic fifty-three-year-old man as a willingness to have sex with him.59 
Both of these cases occurred in 1994, shortly before Rule 412 became effective for 
civil cases. Thus, even without Rule 412, courts rarely found this evidence 
probative.60 This holds true for cases decided after the extension of Rule 412 as 
well. In EEOC v. Rotary Corp., the defendant moved for summary judgment 
arguing that the evidence showed that plaintiff welcomed the sexually harassing 
behavior by her “‘sexually provocative dress and behavior.’”61 The court denied 
summary judgment, holding that this was a matter for the jury. 
In contrast, target dress evidence played a particularly important role in 
Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C.62 In this case, the court used the plaintiff’s attire as part 
of its reasoning in granting summary judgment, even though the plaintiff was 
subjected to fairly severe sexual harassment.63 The case is problematic because it 
predates the Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, which held that plaintiffs who pursue a claim under a hostile 
environment theory could include harassment occurring prior to the 300-day 
claim period under Title VII, so long as at least one act of harassment occurred 
within the 300-day period.64 In Woodard, a great deal of harassing behavior was 
excluded under the pre-Morgan rule, because it occurred before the 300-day cut-
off for employment discrimination claims. However, there still were significant 
acts of harassment within the 300-day period. The clothing-related allegations in 
this case included the fact that the plaintiff owned a lingerie store. She posted 
flyers that included a photo of her modeling the lingerie on a bulletin board at 
work.65 She also offered to put on “private shows” at the store for her co-
workers.66 She wore what the court characterized as “skimpy or provocative” 
clothing to work.67 She filed several motions in limine in an effort to keep this 
evidence out of consideration for purposes of the defendant’s summary 
 
 58. Wilson v. Wayne County, 868 F. Supp. 1254, 1257–60 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
 59. Id. at 1260. The plaintiff still lost on the issue of holding the sheriff individually liable. Title 
VII only applies to the employer and does not provide a mechanism for holding individual harassers 
liable. 
 60. See also Meadows v. Guptill, 856 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding evidence of 
plaintiff’s manner of dress and purported “touchy” behavior had little “probative force,” especially 
given the nature of the sexual harassment allegations in the case). 
 61. EEOC v. Rotary Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 643, 662 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted). 
 62. Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C., No. IP 98-646-C H/G, 2000 WL 684101 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000). 
 63. Id. 
 64. 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). 
 65. Woodard, 2000 WL 684101, at *3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at *6. 
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judgment motion.68 The court considered whether the evidence was admissible 
under Rule 412. The court found the evidence relevant to the subjective 
component of the sexual harassment claim, which was whether the plaintiff 
personally found the behavior harassing.69 Curiously, however, the court did not 
discuss the evidence in terms of unwelcomeness, arguing instead that it was 
relevant to “evaluating whether Metro [the defendant] responded reasonably to 
her complaint and whether Metro should have discovered the alleged 
harassment and responded earlier.”70 
Concluding that such evidence was admissible, the court explained that the 
relevance of the evidence “substantially outweighs any potential unfair 
prejudicial effect of such evidence on Woodard’s claims.”71 The court reasoned 
that the underlying purpose behind Rule 412—preventing embarrassment to the 
plaintiff by revealing private information—would not be furthered in this case, 
because the plaintiff herself brought this information into the workplace.72 The 
plaintiff wore “hot pants,” low-cut tops, and buttocks-revealing shorts to work.73 
When told to put on more clothes for work,74 plaintiff responded, “‘I am wearing 
what I want to wear.’”75 The court ultimately granted the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion, reasoning that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to be actionable and that the employer responded reasonably to her 
complaints.76 
Yet, the acts of harassment in this case were fairly egregious. The plaintiff 
made allegations about four employees at Metro, but of those, the actions of one 
co-worker, Smith, were particularly severe. The plaintiff testified that Smith 
talked about his penis frequently, was “constantly trying to force himself” on 
her, tried to feel her breasts, tried “to feel between her legs,” and tried to kiss 
her.77 It is surprising that such actions would not be subjectively severe or 
pervasive enough to be actionable as a matter of law, even though the plaintiff 
did engage in some voluntary conduct at work. Yet, the court was extremely 
dismissive of this case, beginning its opinion with “[t]his case presents truly 
meritless allegations of sexual harassment. If the case has any effect beyond 
these parties, it will only be to make it more difficult for women who genuinely 
are victims of sexual harassment on the job to prove their cases and obtain 
remedies.”78 This case stands as a rare example of a court reaching such a 
decision. For the most part, courts considered evidence of dress inadmissible or 
not determinative in the cases before them. 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at *6–7. 
 70. Id. at *7. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at *9. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citation omitted). 
 76. Id. at *11. 
 77. Id. at *5. 
 78. Id. at *1. 
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As a general matter, evidence of the sexual harassment target’s dress is not 
playing a major role in determining whether the plaintiff welcomed the 
harassment. While some courts admit such evidence, even when it is admitted, 
it does not prove to be very effective for the defendant. While the history of 
target dress in sexual harassment cases suggests that there would be a lot of 
litigation on this issue, the cases are relatively rare. Instead, target dress is 
coming into play in other ways. 
2. Comments on Dress as Part of the Harassing Behavior 
Another way that target dress is used in sexual harassment cases is by the 
plaintiff herself. In order to prove a claim of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must 
show that the behavior involved was “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive work 
environment.’”79 Plaintiffs use evidence concerning comments about their dress 
as part of the incidents that comprise the harassment. While perhaps one of the 
largest misperceptions about sexual harassment law is that an individual can be 
accused of sexual harassment simply by complimenting a co-worker on his or 
her attire—the case law and legal standards suggest otherwise. While many 
targets of sexual harassment allege comments about their dress as part of the 
sexually harassing incidents, such comments generally are not the only conduct 
or behavior involved in the case, and many of the comments are made in a 
manner that would not be viewed as complimentary. 
Rather than simply being about an individual “looking nice today,” 
sexually-harassing comments objectify or sexualize the target.80 For example, in 
Landrey v. City of Glenwood Springs, the harasser told the plaintiff that “‘there’s 
nothing uglier than a fat woman in stretch pants.’”81 In Ammon v. Baron 
Automotive Group, the plaintiff was told by one of her harassers that “‘I’d love to 
lick those pants off you,’” that she had “‘nice legs,’” and that she “‘should wear 
a dress more often.’”82 While one of her co-workers “associated plaintiff’s attire 
with a street walker or a school teacher,”83 the court did little with these 
comments in the context of deciding the case. Thus, they did not appear to help 
the defendant’s case.84 Similarly, in Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, the 
plaintiff’s manager told her that he would like to see her in a wet t-shirt, asked 
her if she was wearing underwear, and said that he liked her “dress because 
 
 79. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982), and Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 80. See, e.g., Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, 953 F. Supp. 1438, 1446–47 (M.D. Ala. 1996); 
Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992); Hutchison v. Amateur 
Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994); Aldridge v. Kansas, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL 
614323 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 1997). 
 81. 03CV01299EWNBNB, 2006 WL 726634, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2006) (citation omitted). 
 82. 270 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300 n.3, 1301 (D. Kan. 2003) (citation omitted). 
 83. Id. at 1301. This is a curious juxtaposition, as school teachers are generally not thought to 
dress like street walkers. 
 84. The Landrey plaintiff lost on summary judgment, with the court holding that the harassment 
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Landrey, 2006 WL 726634, at *11. Summary 
judgment was denied in Ammon, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1307–08. 
03__BEINER.DOC 2/8/2007 2:01 PM 
138 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:125 2007 
 
when she bent over he could see her ‘tits.’”85 In Magnuson v. Peak Technical 
Services, Inc., the harasser told the plaintiff she “looked so good” that he had to 
“go back into the restroom” to relieve himself sexually.86 Her co-workers also 
discussed her anatomy.87 In both Brassfield and Magnuson, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In Nievaard v. City of Ann Arbor, 
comments were made daily about the plaintiff’s clothes and appearance.88 She 
was told she was “sexy,” that if she “pulled down her shirt a little more the 
workers could have a ‘view all day,’” and that her shirts were “‘too tight.’”89 
In addition, there are cases in which harassers comment on how targets 
look in their work uniforms or attempt to pay what appears to be a 
compliment.90 However, these are rarely the only acts of harassment. For 
example, in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., the plaintiff’s supervisor told her 
how beautiful she looked.91 This was not the only act of harassment, but instead 
was one among many incidents, including “numerous unwelcome and 
upsetting suggestive comments and advances” that the plaintiff’s supervisor 
directed at her.92 In this case, the court upheld a jury’s verdict in the plaintiff’s 
favor.93 Similarly, in Stefanoni v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of 
Burlington, the plaintiff alleged seven incidents of harassment, including five 
compliments on her hair and perfume over a twenty-two month period.94 These 
comments, together with two incidents of physical touching, were insufficient to 
a raise an issue of fact on the severe or pervasive element.95 In another case, a 
hotel employee alleged that a supervisor harassed her by commenting about 
how “attractive” she was, that she was “sexy in her uniform,” and that “she 
turned him on.”96 There were also allegations of unwanted physical contact.97 
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s sexual 
harassment claim, noting that there is a “high bar for what constitutes 
sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment for the purposes of a claim of a 
hostile work environment.”98 Thus, comments about the target’s attire are 
 
 85. 953 F. Supp. at 1446–47 (citation omitted). 
 86. 808 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 87. Id. at 506. 
 88. 124 Fed. App’x 948, 949 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). 
 89. Id. at 952. She was also told that she would fit in better at work if she dressed “less 
femininely.” Id. at 954. The court relegated this comment to a “concern about the appropriateness of 
her attire” and held that it was insufficient to establish a hostile environment. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Holmes v. Razo, No. 94 C 50405, 1995 WL 444407 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1995). 
 91. 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 300. 
 94. 65 Fed. App’x 783, 784 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished). 
 95. See id. at 785–86 (granting defedant’s motion for summary judgment). See also O’Dell v. 
Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting summary judgment for 
defendant where purported harasser, among other things, complimented plaintiff about her 
appearance). 
 96. Baker v. Starwood Hotel & Resort Worldwide, Inc., No. 98-2076, 1999 WL 397405, at *2 (E.D. 
La. June 15, 1999). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *3. 
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sometimes used by the plaintiff as part of the sexually-harassing incidents that 
comprise her claim, although this does not mean that the plaintiff will reach the 
“severe or pervasive” standard necessary to support a claim. 
Consistent with this standard, when a compliment is the only act of 
harassment, courts generally do not find it sufficiently severe or pervasive 
enough to be actionable. In Conley v. City of Lincoln City, the city manager told 
the plaintiff, the chief of police, that “she looked ‘attractive’ and ‘nice’ in her 
police uniform.”99 The court held the comment insufficient to create a hostile 
environment.100 Although the plaintiff tried to link this remark to a request by 
the city manager that she attend a seminar with him, the court did not believe 
that the manager had an “ulterior motive” for the request, explaining instead 
that the plaintiff’s reaction was not “reasonable.”101 
Another set of cases in which the plaintiff used dress allegations to support 
her claim involve situations in which the harasser tried to look down the 
plaintiff’s top or up her dress or skirt.102 While no employer has apparently 
defended these allegations by arguing that the plaintiff’s dress somehow invited 
such behavior, one could imagine that certain tops are easier to look down than 
others. However, thus far, defendants and courts have not focused on how the 
plaintiff’s attire might have led to her harassment. Instead, this evidence is used 
by the plaintiff to prove (although not always successfully) that the severity or 
pervasiveness of the harassment reached a level that was actionable. 
3. Inappropriate Attire Cases 
Another line of cases involving target dress exists in which the plaintiff’s 
superior asks her to dress differently because her attire is considered somehow 
“inappropriate” for the workplace. Plaintiffs have argued that such guidance 
from management about their attire constitutes sexual harassment. Not 
surprisingly, courts have rejected such claims. For example, in Courtney v. 
Landair Transport, Inc., the plaintiff’s manager told her that her attire was not 
appropriate for work because she was “showing too much cleavage.”103 While 
this was one of several allegations of harassment, the court quickly disposed of 
this aspect, stating: 
Plaintiff claims that management discriminated against her because a terminal 
manager cautioned her as to her inappropriate attire in the workplace. A 
manager’s warning, without more, that plaintiff’s clothing is inappropriate in 
 
 99. Conley v. City of Lincoln City, No. 02-216-AS, 2004 WL 948427, at *4 n.2 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 
2004). 
 100. See id. at *12 (holding that defendant’s actions did not amount to sexual harassment). The 
plaintiff had other claims in her case as well. 
 101. Id. at *12. 
 102. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(harasser simulated looking up plaintiff’s dress and tried to look down her clothing); Ammon v. 
Baron Auto. Group, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1308–09 (D. Kan. 2003) (harasser looked up one plaintiff’s 
skirt and attempted to look down another plaintiff’s blouse). 
 103. 227 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2000) (brought under Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws, which are 
interpreted the same as Title VII). 
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the workplace is not sexual harassment. Plaintiff fails to show that the terminal 
manager’s comments were anything more than a legitimate concern regarding 
appropriate dress in the workplace.104 
In Schmitz v. ING Securities, Futures & Options, Inc., part of the plaintiff’s 
sexual harassment allegations included that her purported harasser had called 
her into his office and “accused her of disrupting office productivity by dressing 
so provocatively that any ‘hot-blooded male’ in the office could be aroused.”105 
Her harasser, the CFO of the company, never expressed any interest in her or 
touched her.106 However, once she complained about his comments to the 
director of Human Resources, her workload increased and the CFO became 
“openly hostile and ceased speaking to her.”107 She was eventually terminated 
for inadequate job performance.108 In assessing her claim of sexual harassment, 
the court reasoned that the CFO commented on her appearance “with the 
expressed aim of bettering her professional image and her career prospects.”109 
While he may have failed to “treat a female employee with sensitivity, tact, and 
delicacy,” his comments did not constitute sexual harassment.110 This was 
supported by two of plaintiff’s female superiors, who stated that they too had 
informally commented to the plaintiff that “some of her outfits were not 
appropriate for the business environment.”111 
In Bahri v. Home Depot USA, Inc., one of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
allegations included that comments were made about her dress, hair, and 
shoes.112 Employees complained that the plaintiff, Nelson, dressed “like she was 
‘going to a cocktail party.’”113 Eventually, Nelson’s supervisor told her that her 
shoes violated company policy, that her co-workers were complaining about her 
attire, and requested that she not dress “too fancy” for the home-improvement 
store environment in which she worked.114 The court concluded that these 
comments did not amount to actionable sexual harassment. The court reasoned: 
The evidence concerning Brownlie’s comments about Nelson’s style of dress 
indicate that Nelson and Brownlie simply disagreed over whether her clothing 
looked “professional” or “too fancy.” Such a disagreement, even when between 
members of the opposite sex, is not overtly sexual in nature.115 
 
 104. Id. at 564. 
 105. 191 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion), available at 1999 WL 528024, at **1. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at **2. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at **3. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at **4. 
 112. 242 F. Supp. 2d 922, 950 (D. Or. 2002). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 950. 
 115. Id. at 951. There also was evidence of a profane sex-based term being used with reference to 
the plaintiff, but the employer was not aware of this until after her termination. Id. 
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As a general matter then, an employer’s counseling of an employee to dress 
more professionally or less provocatively has not been found actionable as 
sexual harassment.116 
4. Plaintiff Asked to Dress Provocatively 
There are also cases in which the plaintiff’s employer requires her to dress 
provocatively as part of her job and as a result the plaintiff is harassed. While 
there are entire law review articles written about the restaurant Hooters and its 
wait staff’s attire,117 very few cases against them have been resolved on the 
merits, and the few that have do not directly involve the plaintiff’s dress.118 
Employers generally lost early cases involving allegations that female workers 
were required to dress provocatively. The case often cited on this issue is EEOC 
v. Sage Realty Corp.119 In Sage Realty, the plaintiff worked as a building lobby 
attendant.120 Her employer required her to wear a uniform on the job.121 One 
uniform consisted of an octagonal piece of cloth that resembled an American 
flag that was worn like a poncho.122 On the five-foot-eight plaintiff, the uniform 
revealed “[h]er thighs and portions of her buttocks.”123 Even after attempts at 
alterations, the uniform was still revealing.124 The plaintiff wore the uniform for 
two days and “received a number of sexual propositions and endured lewd 
comments and gestures. Humiliated by what occurred, [the plaintiff] was unable 
to perform her duties properly.”125 Eventually, the plaintiff was fired because she 
refused to wear the uniform.126 The court reasoned that the employer required 
 
 116. But see Kelly v. Lopiccolo, 5 Fed. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (upholding jury 
verdict for plaintiff in § 1983 sexual harassment case in which there were allegations that employer 
counseled plaintiff about wearing undergarments that violated employer guidelines; however, there 
were other allegations of harassment from other employees). 
 117. See generally, e.g., Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters 
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163 (1997); Kelly Ann Cahill, 
Hooters: Should there be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Cases?, 48 VAND L. REV. 1107 (1995). 
 118. See, e.g., Ciesielski v. Hooters Mgmt. Corp., No. 03 C 1175, 2005WL 608245 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 
2005) (jury verdict against Hooters in sexual harassment case where employees were harassers 
upheld; no discussion of waitress attire); EEOC v. Gaffney, No. Civ.A.3:01CV0619-P, 2001 WL 
1338368 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2001) (motion to dismiss sexual harassment complaint denied); Steinhoff 
v. Uprive Rest. Joint Venture, 117 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor; no 
discussion of waitress attire); Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (action 
to compel arbitration); Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93 C 7709, 94 C 6338, 1996 WL 164427 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 29, 1996) (class certification in a sex discrimination based on hiring practices). Some Hooters 
sexual harassment cases have settled. See Andrew Blum, Hooters Suit Lawyer Faces Ethics Complaint 
But the Attorney Hints that Her Ex-Clients Were Intimidated by the Restaurant’s Side, 16 NAT’L L.J. 13, col. 
1 (Nov. 15, 1993); ‘Hooters’ Accord Reached, 16 NAT’L L.J. A8, col. 2 (May 30, 1994). 
 119. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 120. Id. at 602. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 604. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 605. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 607. 
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the plaintiff to wear the uniform because she was a woman and that the uniform 
caused her to endure repeated harassment.127 The court believed that wearing 
the uniform was a condition of the plaintiff’s employment and that the employer 
either knew or could reasonably have expected her to be subjected to sexual 
harassment because of it.128 While acknowledging that an employer may 
“impose reasonable grooming and dress requirements on its employees,” this 
does “not mean that ‘an employer has the unfettered discretion . . . [t]o require 
its employees to wear any uniform the employer chooses, including uniforms 
which may be characterized as revealing and sexually provocative.’”129 
Hooters aside, most commentators agree that employers cannot require 
employees to wear uniforms that subject them to sexual harassment.130 The Sage 
Realty case is from 1981 and is rather dated. It is also somewhat inconsistent 
with the theory that attire alone does not result in women being harassed, which 
is more thoroughly discussed below. Thus, it is not clear what the courts would 
do with a case in which a woman voluntarily agreed to wear a revealing 
uniform. 
5. Sum-Up: How Target Dress Is Actually Addressed in Sexual Harassment 
 Cases 
Overall, the most prevalent cases involving sexual harassment target dress 
appear to be the cases in which the plaintiff raises comments about her attire as 
part of her sexual harassment allegations. While there are some cases addressing 
admissibility under Rule 412, most often the court does not admit the evidence, 
and even when it does, the evidence does not carry much weight. The lack of 
cases in which defendants use target dress in defending cases is in itself 
puzzling. It could be that most defendants refrain from making such arguments 
because of Rule 412. Yet, there seems to be some room for defendants to 
maneuver, given the balancing test, questions about Supreme Court precedent, 
and the Court’s own questioning of the validity of the rule. One might expect, 
some twelve years after the effective date of Rule 412, to see a split in the circuits 
on this issue. 
Another explanation for the lack of cases may be that targets of harassment 
are not generally provocatively dressed. Thus, there would be little opportunity 
for defendants to use these arguments. If sexual harassment is about power, not 
about sexuality or finding someone attractive, then dress comes into play when 
it affects how a harasser targets a victim. The underlying social science that has 
developed around this issue, as well as around the issue of rape, provides 
information that may help explain the lack of cases. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 608. 
 129. Id. at 608–09 (quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 130. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1395, 1416–17 (1992). 
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III. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DRESS 
Social science has much to offer in determining the meaning of women’s 
dress and how it might affect sexual harassment cases. A variety of academic 
disciplines have analyzed women’s dress, looking at what it means to both the 
person wearing the clothing and perceivers of that person as well as its broader 
social implications. This section discusses several aspects of social science that 
may help explain why defendants are not using evidence concerning the 
provocative nature of the plaintiff’s dress to show that the target welcomed the 
harassment. In doing so, it lays the foundation for the argument, made more 
explicitly in the next section, that the reason defendants are not seeking to admit 
evidence of plaintiff’s provocative dress in sexual harassment cases as 
frequently as might be supposed is because provocatively-dressed women may 
not be the likely targets of sexual harassment. 
The section begins by discussing how perceptions of victim dress play a 
role in perceptions of rape and sexual harassment. In this context it investigates 
how a woman’s dress affects perceptions of that woman in a manner that might 
have relevance for sexual harassment law. For example, are provocatively 
dressed women harassed more often, and, more importantly, do people think 
this is the case? Do people believe that provocatively dressed women invite 
harassment? It then looks at what is known about how rapists and, to a lesser 
extent, sexual harassers, choose their victims in an effort to determine whether 
common perceptions of the role dress plays in victimization is accurate. From 
there it looks at characteristics of both rape and sexual harassment victims to see 
if, based on who these women are, sexual harassers may be choosing their 
victims in a manner similar to rapists. It also addresses research about sexual 
harassers to determine if they share some common characteristics with rapists, 
which may make some of the research concerning rape applicable to sexual 
harassment. Finally, it looks for social science explanations for why dress makes 
a difference in perceptions of who is likely to be harassed. Throughout this 
section, I rely on social science of rape in situations in which there is little 
research on sexual harassment. I explain why this is justified at the points in my 
argument where it becomes relevant. 
Underlying rape shield laws is the belief that people, and in particular 
jurors, mistakenly believe that a women’s dress has an impact on whether she 
will be victimized. This belief is borne out by research on perceptions of 
women’s dress. As one source elucidates: 
Although women with provocative appearances are perceived as sexually 
attractive and more desirable, they are judged as less intelligent, sincere, 
trustful, reliable, and less moral than women with non-provocative 
appearances. . . . Further, . . . “appearance influences judgments of a sender’s 
competence (ability or expertise), even when the task at hand is unrelated to 
appearance.”131 
 
 131. Shen, supra note 5, at 439. 
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Clearly, dress influences how people perceive and interact with one another. 
Yet, assessments of women’s attitudes or beliefs based on their dress are not 
necessarily accurate. For example, while people believe that certain items of 
clothing signify more liberal sexual attitudes, one study suggests that in reality, 
few items of clothing actually correlate with such liberal attitudes.132 Thus, 
generally-held perceptions of sexualized dressing may well be out of sync with 
any one individual’s attitudes and behaviors. 
Perhaps most notably, a survey of psychiatrists reported that a three-to-one 
majority of those responding “said that attire that the male perceives as inviting 
direct sex attention does, indeed, tend to increase sex crime risk.”133 The styles of 
clothing that psychiatrists thought carried this potential risk included short 
skirts, see-through dresses, short shorts, and bikinis.134 As they concluded, “[t]he 
survey replies show that U.S. psychiatrists in large numbers believe that 
revealing attire is one of the causative or precipitating factors in sex crimes 
against young females.”135 Thus, highly-educated and learned adults believe that 
how a woman dresses has an impact on whether or not she will be a victim of a 
sex crime. 
The same general findings hold true for dress and sexual harassment. A 
study involving 200 college students sought to determine whether target dress 
and gender of a perceiver played a part in determining who was likely to be 
sexually harassed.136 “The model when wearing provocative clothing was rated 
significantly higher on likelihood of provoking sexual harassment . . . than when 
wearing nonprovocative clothing.”137 Interestingly, women rated the model 
dressed provocatively highest on the likelihood of provoking sexual 
harassment.138 However, men and women did not differ in their assessment of 
the model wearing nonprovocative clothing.139 This suggests that women are 
more inclined to believe that provocative dress has an impact on who is 
harassed. While this study shows women are more inclined to link provocative 
dress with sexual harassment, it is important to note that both men and women 
perceive this link. The question remains whether this perception is accurate. 
While people perceive dress to have an impact on who is assaulted, studies 
of rapists suggest that victim attire is not a significant factor. Instead, rapists 
look for signs of passiveness and submissiveness, which, studies suggest, are 
 
 132. See Eugene W. Mathes & Sherry B. Kempher, Clothing as a Nonverbal Communicator of Sexual 
Attitudes and Behavior, 43 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 495 (1976) (only cut-offs and tops exposing 
midriffs correlated with attitudes toward premarital sex). 
 133. Donna Vali & Nicholas D. Rizzo, Apparel as One Factor in Sex Crimes Against Young Females: 
Professional Opinions of U.S. Psychiatrists, 35 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 167, 
174 (1991). 
 134. Id. at 172. 
 135. Id. at 178. 
 136. Kim K.P. Johnson & Jane E. Workman, Clothing and Attributions Concerning Sexual 
Harassment, 21 HOME ECON. RES. J. 160, 165 (1992). 
 137. Id. at 167. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 167–68. 
03__BEINER.DOC 2/8/2007 2:01 PM 
 SEXY DRESSING REVISITED 145 
 
more likely to coincide with more body-concealing clothing.140 In a study to test 
whether males could determine whether women were high or low in 
passiveness and submissiveness, Richards and her colleagues found that men, 
using only nonverbal appearance cues, could accurately assess which women 
were passive and submissive versus those who were dominant and assertive.141 
Clothing was one of the key cues: “Those females high in passivity and 
submissiveness (i.e., those at greatest risk for victimization) wore noticeably 
more body-concealing clothing (i.e., high necklines, long pants and sleeves, 
multiple layers).”142 This suggests that men equate body-concealing clothing 
with passive and submissive qualities, which are qualities that rapists look for in 
victims. Thus, those who wore provocative clothes would not be viewed as 
passive or submissive, and would be less likely to be victims of assault. 
Along these lines, research suggests that rape victims are “significantly 
lower” in “dominance, assertiveness, and social presence.”143 While members of 
the public believe that victims of assault attract such attacks by dressing 
provocatively,144 attractiveness does not correlate with submissive characteristics 
in victims.145 Instead, research “specifically revealed a negative relationship 
between perceptions of attractiveness and traits which could be construed as 
contributing to a nonverbal appearance of vulnerability.”146 Thus: 
Male evaluators perceived attractive females as lower in submissiveness, 
uncertainty, simpleness, carelessness and passivity than their less attractive 
peers. This suggests that conventional definitions of physical attractiveness do 
not represent visual attributes which enhance a woman’s potential for 
victimization.147 
This seems at odds with studies concerning provocative dress, although no 
studies have looked directly at provocative dress and submissiveness. Of course, 
attractiveness and provocative dress are not the same thing. As Glick and his 
colleagues point out, it can be difficult to alter one’s physical attractiveness, “but 
women can easily emphasize or deemphasize their sexuality through clothing 
and demeanor.”148 Thus, dressing sexy or provocatively is a choice that may or 
may not lead to a woman being perceived as attractive. Still, women who dress 
provocatively may be exhibiting a degree of confidence that does not suggest 
submissiveness. These women would be less likely to be victims of sexual 
 
 140. Shen, supra note 5, at 441. 
 141. Lynne Richards, A Theoretical Analysis of Nonverbal Communication and Victim Selection for 
Sexual Assaults, 9 CLOTHING & TEXTILES RES. J. 55, 59–60 (Summer 1991) (discussing Lynne Richards 
et al., Perceptions of Submissiveness: Implications for Victimization, 125 J. PSYCH. 407 (1991)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 59. 
 144. One study showed that “only four percent of reported rapes involve precipitous behavior 
by the victim.” Sterling, supra note 5, at 119. 
 145. Richards, supra note 141, at 59. 
 146. Id. (citing A. Miller, Role of Physical Attractiveness in Impression Formation, 19 PSYCHONOMIC 
SCI. 241 (1970)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Peter Glick et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- and High-Status Jobs, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN 
Q. 389, 389 (2005). 
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assault or harassment, because potential abusers would not perceive them as 
passive or submissive. 
No studies were readily available that explained how sexual harassers 
target their victims. However, there is information about who is more likely to 
be targeted for sexual harassment. Interestingly, it parallels what is known 
about rape victims: “Young and single women tend to be the targets of sexual 
harassment.”149 However, sexual harassment can happen to any women, and, 
studies show, once other factors are considered (such as workplace 
characteristics and the form the sexual harassment takes), the impact of age and 
marital status on who is harassed lessens considerably.150 Youth and being single 
are factors related to power. As one researcher observed, “[d]ifferences in age, 
marital status, and education reinforce gender differences in power and status in 
society.”151 Thus, because sexual harassment is about power, differences in these 
power-related statuses are likely to correlate with who is sexually harassed. 
This parallels research on rape victims. While, like sexual harassment, any 
woman can be a rape victim, “studies have shown that the rape victim is more 
likely to be a single, white or black young female, from a lower social working 
class. Further ‘women who are most vulnerable to rape exhibit lower levels of 
psychosocial effectiveness’ and tend to have passive or submissive personalities 
prior to the assaults.”152 
Thus, it appears that victims of rape and victims of sexual harassment share 
some common characteristics. Yet, much of the research discussed above 
involves how rapists choose their victims—not how sexual harassers choose 
their targets. Thus, it may not be directly applicable to sexual harassment. 
However, research also suggests that perpetrators of more serious sexual 
harassment are on a continuum with rapists.153 Research on rapists might be 
likewise helpful in determining how sexual harassers choose their targets. 
Sexual harassers, like rapists, may pick victims who are vulnerable and 
submissive. Research on men who are likely to sexually harass suggests that this 
leap is logical. 
Psychologist John Pryor was one of the first to study characteristics of men 
who sexually harass. He developed a scale to determine the propensity of men 
to sexually harass.154 His sexual harassment research is based, in part, on the 
research of those who study rape. As he explains, “[m]any researchers believe 
rape and severe forms of sexual harassment are conceptually similar forms of 
 
 149. James E. Gruber, An Epidemiology of Sexual Harassment: Evidence from North America and 
Europe, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 84, 92 (William O’Donohue 
ed., 1997). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 90. 
 152. Shen, supra note 5, at 437 (quoting Richards, supra note 141, at 58) (footnotes omitted). 
 153. See, e.g., John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269 (1987); John B. 
Pryor & Lynnette M. Stoller, Sexual Cognition Processes in Men High in the Likelihood to Sexually Harass, 
20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 163 (1994). Rapists have a “pronounced psychological need[] 
for dominance and aggression.” Richards, supra note 141, at 61. 
 154. Pryor, supra note 153, at 272–73. 
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behavior.”155 Researchers see rape as on a continuum of “male-
aggressive/female-passive” interactions that involve differing levels of coercion 
and sexual intimacy.156 This led Pryor to opine that rapists and sexual harassers 
might have some characteristics in common. As a result, he set out to study 
characteristics of sexual harassers to see if this was true. 
Pryor examined those who would be inclined to engage in sexual 
exploitation, essentially what amounts to quid pro quo harassment. Pryor used 
various other scales, including those that measured certain attitudes about sex 
roles and beliefs, attitudes towards feminism, likelihood to rape, and one that 
measured empathy.157 What he found was a strong relationship between the 
likelihood-to-sexually-harass scale (LSH) and adversary sexual beliefs and rape-
myth acceptance.158 Weaker relationships were found for sex-role stereotyping 
and acceptance of interpersonal violence.159 Tellingly, “[t]he single best predictor 
of LSH was Malamuth’s (1981) LR [likelihood-to-rape] scale. This result . . . 
supports [another researcher’s] contention that rape and severe forms of sexual 
harassment represent different degrees of coercive sexual conduct.”160 
Interestingly, men who scored higher on the LSH scale also had a harder time 
understanding the perspective of others.161 As Pryor explained, “[t]he profile of a 
person who is likely to initiate severe sexually harassing behavior that emerges 
from the initial study is one that emphasizes sexual and social male 
dominance.”162 
This scale has proven useful after further study. As Pryor and Stoller point 
out, “the LSH scale measures a readiness to use social power for sexually 
exploitative purposes. This suggests that social dominance and male sexuality 
may be closely aligned concepts in the minds of high-LSH men.”163 In a 
subsequent study, they found that dominance was the best predictor of LSH in 
men. As they explained, “[t]his finding seems to buttress the argument that 
dominance and sexuality are integrally related for high-LSH men.”164 Thus, it 
seems appropriate to opine that sexual harassers might choose their targets in a 
manner similar to that of rapists. These two groups of perpetrators share 
common characteristics. Further, sexual harassment by high LSH men appears 
to be triggered by power imbalances—the kind of imbalances that might well be 
triggered by target submissiveness. 
 
 155. Id. at 272. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 277–78. 
 158. Id. at 275. As examples, Pryor explained that adversarial sexual beliefs include: “In a dating 
relationship a woman is largely out to take advantage of a man . . . . [R]ape myth acceptance 
[includes such beliefs that] ‘[m]any women have an unconscious wish to be raped, and may 
unconsciously set up a situation in which they are likely to be attacked.’” Id. at 275–76. 
 159. Id. at 276. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 277. 
 163. Pryor & Stoller, supra note 153, at 164. 
 164. Id. at 166. 
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This conclusion is inconsistent with the common belief that how a woman 
dresses has an impact on whether she will be sexually harassed or sexually 
assaulted. Why then, do many people, including psychiatrists, assume that dress 
plays some part in who is a victim of sexual assaults? In particular, why do 
women believe this? Social scientists believe this is the result of the “just world 
hypothesis.” As Melvin Lerner explained, 
for their own security, if for no other reason, people want to believe they live in 
a just world where people get what they deserve. One way of accomplishing 
this is by . . . persuading himself that the victim deserved to suffer, after all. The 
assumption here is that attaching responsibility to behavior provides us with the 
greater security—we can do something to avoid such a fate.165 
Thus, in the context of sexual harassment, this explains why women, more than 
men, are inclined to believe that provocative dress has an impact on who is 
sexually harassed. Women attribute the harassment to something the victim has 
done, such as wearing provocative clothing, as a way to understand how it 
could happen to someone else and not to them. Thus, blaming the victim, for 
example, by believing she provoked the behavior by her dress, makes other 
women believe that dressing differently (i.e., more “appropriately”) will prevent 
it from happening to them.166 
This is closely related to another theory known as “harm avoidance.” 
Women blame victims as a way to exercise control over their lives and to 
continue to believe that bad things, including sexual harassment and sexual 
assaults, will not happen to them.167 Thus, by viewing provocative dress as a 
factor in sexual harassment, women believe that they can avoid sexual 
harassment simply by not dressing provocatively. Both of these theories provide 
explanations as to why women, in particular, may think that harassment or 
sexual assault is provoked by victim dress. 
Thus, how people commonly perceive the role of a target’s dress in sexual 
harassment appears to be out of sync with how sexual harassers may choose 
their targets. This leads to a possible explanation as to why defendants are not 
using target dress to prove unwelcomeness. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DRESS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
The social science described above suggests some potential explanations as 
to why defendants do not regularly raise the issue of target dress to rebut 
unwelcomeness in sexual harassment cases. Given the purported recent increase 
 
 165. Melvin J. Lerner, Desire for Justice and Reactions to Victims, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING 
BEHAVIOR: SOME SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 205 (J. 
Macaulay & L. Berkowitz, eds., 1970), quoted in Theresa L. Lennon, Sharron J. Lennon & Kim K.P. 
Johnson, Is Clothing Probative of Attitude or Intent? Implications for Rape and Sexual Harassment Cases, 11 
LAW & INEQ. 391, 410–11 (1993). 
 166. Lennon, Lennon & Johnson, supra note 165, at 411. 
 167. Johnson & Workman, supra note 136, at 164, 170. 
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in provocative dress by women168 and the lack of a solid legal standard against 
its admission, one would expect to see defendants using arguments and 
evidence about target dress to prove welcomeness—or at least, to dis-prove un-
welcomeness. Yet, this practice appears uncommon. How does one account for 
this? Earlier in this article I suggested several potential explanations. First, it 
could be that defendants are not raising it because they believe either that they 
will not be successful in having the evidence admitted under Rule 412 or that 
the factfinder will be in some way offended by such attempts. Essentially, the 
tactic might backfire on the defendant. Second, it is possible that women who 
wear provocative clothing to work do not mind the attention that they receive 
from it and therefore are not bringing sexual harassment claims. Third, it is 
possible that victim dress does not have an impact on who is sexually harassed. 
Legal feminists have long argued that sexual harassment is about power. With 
this in mind, the work of social scientists suggests that potential harassers might 
choose their targets using criteria other than dress. 
Legal and social science scholars have proposed a number of theories 
suggesting why and how sexual harassment occurs. The foremost legal scholar 
on this issue, Catharine MacKinnon, posited early on that sexual harassment is 
about power differences between men and women. Sexual harassment is a tool 
used to perpetuate hierarchy, the principal way in which men maintain their 
dominance in American society.169 As several psychology researchers described 
the theory, 
[a]ccording to this model, male dominance is maintained by cultural patterns of 
male-female interaction as well as by economic and political superordinancy. 
Society rewards males for aggressive and domineering sexual behaviors and 
females for passivity and acquiescence. . . . [T]he function of sexual harassment 
is to manage ongoing male-female interactions according to accepted sex status 
norms, and to maintain male dominance occupationally and therefore 
economically, by intimidating, discouraging, or precipitating removal of women 
from work.170 
This theory fits well with what is known about men who sexually harass. These 
men are influenced by dominance—power—in their relationships with women. 
Thus, this provides an explanation of why women who are provocatively 
 
 168. See Dennis Hall, Delight in Disorder: A Reading of Diaphany and Liquefaction in Contemporary 
Women’s Clothing, 34 POPULAR CULTURE 65, 66 (2001). Hall sees four fashion tactics that are being 
used by women to reveal more skin: (1) presenting underwear as clothing; (2) choosing clothing that 
is cut to be highly revealing, i.e., plunging necklines, slit skirts, bare tummies, short shorts; (3) 
diaphany (see-through garments); and (4) what he terms liquefaction (the use of opaque fabrics that 
fit so tightly that they cling like skin). A rather ironic instance of this recently arose within the 
United States Office of the Special Counsel (OSC), which is the office that protects federal workers 
and whistle-blowers. The OSC recently put out an office newsletter of “Business Casual” do’s and 
don’ts that included not wearing short skirts and tight pants, advising women that, “before choosing 
a skirt to wear,” they should “sit down in it facing a mirror.” Elizabeth Williamson, A Published Dress 
Code is Dressed Down in Furor, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A25. 
 169. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 107 (1979). 
 170. Sandra S. Tangri et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 
33, 40 (Winter 1982) (citation omitted). 
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dressed might not be bringing sexual harassment cases: They are not good 
potential targets for harassers. If, as studies of rapists suggest, harassers look for 
more passive or submissive women, women who are provocatively dressed may 
appear more confident and are therefore less likely to be considered appropriate 
targets by potential harassers. Indeed, the cases involving requests that women 
dress more professionally or tone down their sexy attire suggest that people are 
generally uncomfortable with women who dress provocatively in the 
workplace. The power dynamic involved in telling women to dress less 
provocatively (essentially trying to control their attire) is also interesting. It 
suggests that there is power in dressing provocatively, and that employers are 
uncomfortable by such assertions of this power by women.171 
I am aware that I am extrapolating at least in part from research on rapists 
for this argument. This is one area that requires further study by social scientists 
to determine whether sexual harassers are picking their targets much like rapists 
pick their victims—based on indications of passivity and submissiveness. At this 
point, this theory is somewhat speculative—rapists and sexual harassers share 
some common characteristics, and victims of rape and sexual harassment also 
share several common characteristics. To the extent that there is incomplete 
research on sexual harassers, this essay serves as a call to social scientists who 
study sexual harassment to do further scholarship on how sexual harassers 
choose their targets. 
There is another problem with this potential explanation. Just because a 
woman is dressed provocatively does not mean that she is necessarily confident 
and therefore less likely to be submissive. It could well be that her lack of 
confidence is what induces her to dress provocatively, in an attempt to draw 
what she considers to be positive attention to herself. Perhaps there is a class of 
cases that never make it to court because the women involved do not find the 
attention their attire garners harassing. Indeed, they may enjoy the attention. 
Further, to the extent that the attention is considered complimentary (i.e., it is 
not derogatory or otherwise demeaning), it may not be objectionable by these 
women. 
Other sexual harassment theorists posit that sexual harassment is a result of 
an interaction between people and workplace characteristics and situations.172 
Workplace environments in which sexualized images, comments, and behavior 
toward women are tolerated are more likely to be those in which women are 
sexually harassed.173 This theory, however, is not inconsistent with the 
power/dominance model. In workplaces with such atmospheres, women are 
placed in less powerful positions: They are essentially deemed sex objects. It is 
little wonder that sexual harassment thrives in such environments, given the 
little organizational power afforded to women. 
This also might explain the one set of cases where provocatively dressed 
women are commonly harassed: the Hooters cases. Studies show that men high 
 
 171. Further examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
 172. BEINER, supra note 42, at 126. 
 173. See id. at 126–30. 
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in LSH are aware of situational constraints on their behavior.174 Thus, in an 
environment like Hooters, where the Hooters Girl’s “predominant function is to 
provide vicarious sexual recreation, to titillate, entice, and arouse male 
customers’ fantasies,”175 men who are likely to sexually harass will consider the 
Hooters’ business plan to permit (perhaps even encourage) such harassment. 
Thus, while provocative dress might signal confidence in an office setting, at 
Hooters, workplace norms encourage men who are so inclined to harass. 
What about the women who complain about men making comments about 
their attire as part of their sexual harassment allegations? It is not clear whether 
these women were dressed in a provocative manner or not. Certainly, in some 
cases they were not. For example, in Conley v. City of Lincoln City, the plaintiff 
was in her police uniform.176 In addition, employers in these cases (aside for rare 
exceptions such as the lingerie case177) did not argue that something about the 
plaintiff’s attire “caused” the plaintiff to be harassed. Yet, clearly inappropriate 
comments—including those that are sexually demeaning—about workplace 
dress offend women. They are a weapon in the arsenal of harassing behaviors 
that affect women’s employment. Some of these comments clearly would 
undermine a woman’s workplace authority, because the comments are 
demeaning and thereby undermine the plaintiff’s power and authority in the 
workplace. Even in the case involving the police chief, commenting, although 
apparently in a complimentary fashion, about her attire could cast her as 
something to look at rather than someone who leads the police force. One could 
imagine how these comments might have affected her ability to lead and why 
she included them in her complaint. Thus, comments about dress are used to 
undermine the workplace authority of women and should be included in the 
appropriate case as part of a plaintiff’s sexual harassment allegations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When I began research for this article, I expected to find many cases 
involving allegations that the plaintiff “welcomed” the sexual harassment by her 
workplace attire. I was surprised to find that this was a rare case. Defendants 
were not using the woman’s dress to weasel out of claims, but instead, the 
woman’s dress most commonly was present in allegations by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs frequently raised comments about their dress as part of their sexual 
harassment allegations. This would seem to open the door to defendants, who 
might use evidence of target dress to argue that the plaintiff welcomed the 
harassment. Yet, that was not the case. I have tried to account for the lack of case 
law and, in the process, have gone back to the root cause of sexual harassment: 
power. Sexual harassment is about power; therefore, a target who is dressed 
provocatively is not the ideal target for the would-be harasser, who appears 
motivated at least in part by his ability to dominate his victim. Provocative dress 
 
 174. See id. at 130 (discussing studies). 
 175. HI Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
 176. No. 02-216-AS, 2004 WL 948427, at *4 n.2 (D. Ore. Apr. 20, 2004). 
 177. Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C., No. IP 98-646-C H/G, 2000 WL 684101 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000). 
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does not necessarily signify submissiveness but instead may be an indication of 
confidence and assertiveness. It is clear, however, that comments about dress 
directed at plaintiffs are a component of sexual harassment allegations. 
Comments about dress are used to undermine working women’s authority and 
should be considered seriously by courts assessing sexual harassment claims. 
